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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Trespass Prosecution
Not Discrimination by State
Defendant Negroes entered the portion of an ice cream parlor reserved for whites. The building was separated by a partition, and had
separate doors marked "White" and "Colored." They requested service; the owner refused to give them service and asked them to leave.
The Negroes declined to leave, saying they could not do so "without
doing damage to the Constitution."
Defendants were arrested and convicted of criminal trespass.' They
claimed that separation by color for service was a violation of their
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Rodman, concluded 2 that: (1) the appellants had been correctly convicted
because the discriminatory action involved was merely private conduct,
and not state action of the character forbidden by the fourteenth amendment; (2) the occupier of land may accept or reject anyone on his
premises for whatever whim suits his fancy; (3) the right of a private
enterprise operator to select the clientele he will serve and to make the
selection based on race if he so desires has been repeatedly recognized by
the courts of the nation; and (4) the fact that the proprietor paid a
license tax, the license containing no restrictions on whom could be
served, cannot be construed to justify a trespass.
The court had ample authority for concluding that the fourteenth
amendment precludes discriminative state action but not purely private
action8 in the field of private enterprise, although inroads are being
made on private discrimination.4 But was the court correct in con'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134 (1953).
2 State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).
"Since the decision of this court in the Civil Rights Cases, the principle has
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said
to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
13 (1948) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
'A rail carrier may not transfer a Negro from a Pullman to a second-class car,
even though an Arkansas statute required it, because the Interstate Commerce Act
forbids it and Congress has pre-empted the field. Mvitchell v. United States, 313
U.S. 80 (1941). Following several cases holding that state statutes regulating party
primaries were state action, and therefore Negroes might vote therein, South Carolina repealed all of its primary election laws and the defendant contended that the
political party was a private organization and not subject to the prohibitions of the
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cluding that this was private discrimination rather than state action?5
Even if one might conclude, or assume arguendo, that this was state

action, it does not necessarily follow that it was of a character precluded
by the fourteenth amendment. What is necessary is state action plus
a violation of one of the clauses set out in section one of the amendment.6
Shelley v. Kraemrer 7 declares that judicial enforcement of privately

drawn racially restrictive covenants is state action violating the fourteenth amendment. The Negroes in that case contended that all three
clauses of the amendment were violated. The decision rested on a violation of equal protection of the laws, the Court finding "it unnecessary
to consider whether petitioners have also been deprived of property
Constitution against state action. The court held that party officials were subject
to the limitations of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. "Having undertaken
to perform an important function relating to the exercise of sovereignty by the
people, they may not violate the fundamental principles laid down by the Constitution
for its exercise." Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1947). Cf. Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, dert. denied, 339
U.S. 981 (1949), where the court held that a private housing corporation could
discriminate on the basis of color in selecting its tenants, even though the city and
state aided the corporation by condemning the land for the project and giving it
tax advantages, because the aid extended and the control exercised were insufficient
to constitute state action.
After the Dorsey case, the New York legislature passed an act, N.Y. CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW § 18-a, to provide against racial discrimination in the selection of
tenants for privately owned, but publicly-assisted, housing accommodations. This
law was held constitutional in New York State Comm'n v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1958), on the grounds that private property rights
are subject to be regulated by the exercise of police power legislation, and that
the state had the right either to leave abstention from racial discrimination in
housing accommodations to the conscience of the individual, or to forbid racial
discrimination in housing.
"But the present cases . . .do not involve action by state legislatures or city
councils. Here the particular patterns of discrimination and the areas in which
the restrictions are to operate, are determined, in the first instance, by the terms of
agreements among private individuals. Participation of the State consists in the
enforcement of the restrictions so defined." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12
(1948).
"That the actions of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities
is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this
Court." Id. at 14.
"[Jiudical action is not immunized from the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment simply because it is taken pursuant to the state's common law policy.
Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a
private agreement." Id. at 20.
' U.S. Co msr. amend. XIV, § 1. "That Amendment prohibits the respective
states from making laws abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States or denying to any person within the jurisdiction of a state the equal
protection of the laws." Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 664 (1951). "It is
State action of a particular character that is prohibited. .. . It nullifies and makes
void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them
in life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of
them the equal protection of the laws." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
7334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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without due process of law or denied privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States."8 However, the Court noted that "among
the civil rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy,
own and dispose of property," citing congressional civil rights legislation1" as a source of the rights. Thus, although the Court does not say
so, it would seem that the privileges and immunities clause was also
violated, because the privilege or right to own property was specifically
negated by the state action. Was the due process clause also violated
in Shelley v. Kraemer? That question admits of more doubt, but the
Negroes were being ordered by the state courts to move away from the
restricted property they had already purchased, and that could easily be
held a deprivation of property without due process. Was there also
deprivation of liberty without due process? Normally when the word
"liberty" is preceded by the word "life," as in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, one thinks in terms of gallows and prison. Yet, in Bolling
v. Sharpe,1 a District of Columbia case in which the fourteenth amendment was not applicable, the Court took the attitude that school segregation was a deprivation of liberty under the fifth amendment. So, perhaps in the Kraemer case there was also a deprivation of liberty.
Assuming that arresting and convicting defendants constituted state
action in the principal case, it is still necessary to determine if any of
the three clauses of the fourteenth amendment were violated by such
state action.
It would seem that the privileges and immunities clause was not
violated, because unlike the right to own property, which is defined by
statute,12 there is no specific right or privilege to enter the premises of
another and remain after being asked to depart.13 In fact, the civil and
8 Id. at 23.
9Ibid.
10 "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 14 STAT. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1982 (1952).
11347

U.S. 497 (1954).

"Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with any great precision,
that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under
law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and
it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective ....

[T]hus it

[segregation] imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden
that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due
Process
Clause." Id. at 499-500.
1214 STAT. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1952).
12 "At common law, a person engaged in a public calling, such as innkeeper or
common carrier, was held to be under a duty to the general public and was obliged
to serve, without discrimination, all who sought service. On the other hand,
proprietors of private enterprises, such as places of amusement and resort, were
under no such obligation, enjoying an absolute power to serve whom they pleased."
Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 253, 72 N.E.2d 697, 698

(1947).
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criminal laws of trespass and real property laws put the privilege of
peaceful possession in the owner.
Was this deprivation of liberty or property without due process
of law? Again it seems that this question must be answered in terms
of rights. The defendants were deprived of property by fines, but
the fines were imposed for violating a non-discriminatory statute applicable to everyone. Was there substantive due process? If there
was a right in the defendants to be on the premises, the deprivation
was without due process; if there was no right, then the deprivation
was with due process.
Was there equal protection of the laws? In the Kraemer case
it was contended that since the laws applied to everyone alike, there
was no denial of equal protection. The Court said that this contention would not bear scrutiny. The reason is that the fourteenth
amendment guarantees personal rights to the individual, and to deny
another class of persons these same rights is not equal protection, but
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities. Therein lies the key difference
in the principal case and Kraemer; in the former there existed no
right in the defendants to occupy the premises after being asked to
depart, and in the latter there exists a right to own property which
may not be negated by state action. The contrary argument is that,
in substance, the proprietor has elected segregation; that by arresting
the defendants, the state has made the action of the individual its own
action, adopting 14 his motives and rules; and that this is a type of
state action precluded by the fourteenth amendment. The North Carolina court answers this argument by saying in effect that it does not
look to the motive or reasoning of the possessor, but only to the wrongful disturbance of his possession.
WILTON RANKIN
"A franchise is a special privilege, conferred by the State on an individual,
which does not belong to the individfial as a matter of common right. It creates
a privilege where none existed before." Id. at 255, 72 N.E.2d at 699.
"A license, on the other hand, is no more than a permission to exercise a preexisting right or privilege which has been subjected to regulation in the interest of
public welfare. The grant of the license to promote the public good, in and of
itself, however, makes neither the purpose a public one nor the license a franchise,
neither renders the enterprise public nor places the licensee under obligation to
the public." Ibid.
The licensee is not an administrative agency of the state simply because he pays
a tax or fee for his license. Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, supra.
Plaintiff Negro was refused service at a restaurant in Washington solely
because of color. She failed to state a cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment, because it applies only to state action and not to one who acts as a
private individual. However, a cause was stated under the Civil Rights Act of
the State of Washington. Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1949).
"' See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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Constitutional Law-Uniform Act to Secure Compulsory Attendance
of Out-of-State Witnesses
In a recent case,1 a judge of the Court of General Sessions of New
York had a certificate filed in a Florida circuit court recommending
that a certain person be taken into custody and delivered to an officer
of the State of New York. This was requested in order to compel his
attendance as a witness before a New York grand jury investigating
a possible conspiracy to steal labor union funds. The certificate was
filed in accordance with a Florida law2 which provided two alternative
methods for compelling a witness within the state to attend a criminal
proceeding in another state. Under this law the witness could be placed
in the custody of officers from another state, or the Florida court
could issue a subpoena ordering him to appear before the out-of-state
proceedings. In the principal case the person sought as a witness was
a resident of Illinois, a state not having such a statute, and was at the
time a visitor in Florida. The Florida court held that the statute was
repugnant to the Federal Constitution and refused to take this person
into custody. On appeal the state supreme court affirmed.
The Florida court based its decision primarily on two grounds. The
first reason advanced was that the statute violated the right of free
ingress and egress among the states. The court affirmed that this was
a privilege of national citizenship and thereby protected under the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment against
infringement by state action.8 Secondly, the court stated that article IV,
section 2 of the Constitution guarantees that citizens of each state are
vouchsafed the privileges and immunities appurtenant to citizens of
all other states. It seems the court was inferring that, when a person
has the right to be immune from rendition in the state in which he resides, another state could not deprive him of this immunity even though
he voluntarily left the former state and came within the jurisdiction
of another state. Although the question was not presented by the
facts, the court went on to say that the alternative provision which provided only for a subpoena ordering the witness to appear at the out-ofstate proceeding was also unconstitutional. The court's basis for this
ruling was "that the courts of this state are without power to issue
process effective beyond the borders of this state."4
'Application of the People of the State of. New York, 100 So. 2d 149 (Fla.
1958).
'FA. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (1941).
'Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908). Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
' Application of the People of the State of New York, 100 So. 2d 149, 155 (Fla.
1958).
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The Florida law in question was modeled after the Uniform Act
which was adopted by the Interstate Crime Commission in 1936.r This
act was designed to prevent state borders from becoming effective barriers for those who would avoid their public duty as material witnesses
simply because of personal inconvenience or a desire to circumvent
the administration of criminal justice.
The origin of this type legislation in the United States may be
traced back as far as 1792. In that year New Hampshire passed an
act 6 under which a person within the state, certified as a material witness in a criminal proceeding, could be summoned to attend trial in any
court of another state. Subsequently, similar laws were enacted by
all the New England states,7 and in 1902 New York passed a comparable statute.8 In general these statutes were of an awkward nature
and applied only to border states. In 1923 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws took cognizance of the great
need for effective state legislation in this area, and in 1931 the ConferAttendance
ence adopted a draft of "An Act to Secure the Compulsory
9
of Non-Resident Witnesses in Criminal Cases."
The early state statutes and the draft adopted by the Conference on
Uniform State Laws provided for compulsory attendance only when a
10
There was no provision
criminal prosecution was already pending.
for grand jury investigations. Neither was there any provision for the
arrest and delivery of unwilling witnesses to secure their attendance.
Both the foregoing provisions were incorporated into the Uniform Act
passed by the Interstate Crime Commission. 1 Today, the Uniform
Act, which is reciprocal, has been made law in forty-three states. 12 Surprisingly, there have been very few cases dealing with the constitution'UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHIN OR
WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (hereinafter called the "Uniform

Act").
'N.H. Laws 1792, at 251-252.
'

Me. Laws 1855, c. 184; Mass. Laws 1873, c. 319; Vt. Acts 1878, No. 43; Conn.

Acts 1903, c. 87; RI. Laws 1907, c. 1462.
' Laws of New York 1902, c. 94. A draft later approved by the National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was basically a restatement
of this New York law.

'NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS, HANDBOOK at 122, 417-23 (1931).
"oNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS, HANDBOOK at 333 (1936).
"INTERSTATE CRIME COMMISsION, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL

at 31-33 (1949). 9 U.L.A. at 32-34 (1942). Also, under the earlier draft adopted
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the radius of rendition was limited
to 1,000 miles. The new Uniform Act contains no limitation as to distance. For
a discussion of the mechanics of the Uniform Act as well as the operation of

earlier legislation, see Note, 19 N.C.L. REv. 391 (1941).

"sAll states except Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan.
GEN. STAT. §§ 8-65 to -70 (1953).

See N.C.
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ality of such legislation. The principal case dramatically brings into
issue the validity of this act, especially with respect to the two added
provisions described above.
In 1904 the first case arose testing the early New York law.' 3 The
court declared it to be a violation of due process and unconstitutional.
However, this decision was admittedly made in haste and without
proper research.' 4 Seven years later, in Massachusetts v. Klaus,'5 the
New York court overruled this earlier holding. The majority of the
court held the statute to be valid and rejected arguments of unconstitutionality based on due process, the privileges and immunities clause,
and the alleged invalid extraterritorial operation of the law. For a
number of years this decision stood unquestioned as the leading case on
the subject.
However, in 1940 an inferior court of Pennsylvania held the new
Uniform Act to be unconstitutional. 16 Three reasons were advanced as
the basis for this decision: (1) that the law abridged the privilege .of
ingress and egress among the.states, (2) that it denied citizens of a
state the privileges and immunities of the state in which they reside, and
(3) that the authority of one state may not be extended beyond its own
borders. This case did not reach a court of last resort.
In re Cooper,'7 in 1941, was the first case testing the Uniform Act
which reached a state supreme court. In this decision the Supreme
Court of New Jersey declared the Uniform Act to be constitutional,
holding that a person certified as a material witness for the defense in a
pending criminal case could be taken into custody and delivered to
officials of another state to assure his attendance. In so holding, the
court rejected objections based on due process. The privileges and immunities clause was not raised as an objection in this case. The New
Jersey court reaffirmed this decision in 1954 and upheld the validity of
the act as applied to witnesses desired by a grand jury.'8
"In re Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 45 Misc. 46, 90 N.Y. Supp. 808 (Sup.

Ct."'1904).
"As the moving party has requested, and the circumstances call for, an
immediate decision of this motion, I have had no time to prepare more than this
brief expression of my impressions." Ibid.
" 145 App. Div. 798, 130 N.Y. Supp. 713 (1st Dep't 1911). Here, in a five to
four decision, the court gave an excellent discussion of all the aspects of this
type 1legislation.
" In re People of New York, 103 LEGAL INTELL. 1055 (Phila. County Ct. of
Quarter Sess. Dec. 6, 1940). This was the first case to pass on the merits of the
Uniform Act. The title of the act had been modified as the result of a New Jersey
decision in 1936. People of New York v. Parker, 16 N.J. Misc. 471, 1 A.2d 54
(Cir.
Ct. 1936).
17 127 N.J.L. 312, 22 A.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
8In5 re Saperstein, 30 N.J. Super. 373, 104 A2d 842 (App. Div. 1954). The
court held in this case that the witness, in addition to being compelled to attend,
could be made to produce books and records.
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In the principal case the court appears to emphasize the fact that
the person sought was not charged with a crime and that no criminal
action was then pending. The court also states "that the right of ingress and egress is not absolute, for instance, the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit exercise by the state of the police power to protect
the health, morals and general welfare of the people."' 1 Perhaps the
Florida court would include within this police power the authority to
grant rendition of material witnesses if there is a criminal proceeding
already pending.
The police power of every state unquestionably includes the authority to require persons within the state's borders to testify at grand jury
investigations within that state. This is a fundamental principle of both
English and American common law. 20 When this is done there is a
definite infringement of a person's right of egress from the state. Today,
it is difficult to see the value of a distinction which permits compulsory
attendance before a grand jury in the state in which a person is located
when he is summoned, and which disallows rendition for testimony
before a grand jury in another state. The terms of the Uniform Act
specify that a person shall not be summoned if "undue hardship" would
be involved in the trip. 21 In the realm of the police power, legislative
judgment has been accorded great weight unless it was clearly beyond
the bounds of constitutionality. Should not the legislature be allowed
to exercise this power so as to include the investigation of crime, which
is the necessary forerunner of criminal prosecution?
The traditional interpretation which the courts have made regarding the application of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution has been
that this section prohibits discrimination by a state in favor of its own
citizens and against citizens of other states. 22 Certainly the language
of the Uniform Act applies equally to all those within the state's
borders.2 There is no discrimination. The power of a state over people
within its borders is plenary with respect to the police power. If the
"oApplication of the People of the State of New York, 100 So. 2d 149, 157 (Fla.
1958).
20 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
21
UNIFORM ACT To SECURE THE ATrENDANCE

AND2 WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

OF WITNESSES FROM

§

WITHIN

2.

Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In
this decision it was stated that this clause does not import that a citizen of one
state carries with him into another fundamental privileges and immunities which
come to him necessarily by the mere fact of citizenship in his state, but that in
any state every citizen of any other state is to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that state enjoy. The Court added that the section
prevents a state from discriminating against citizens of other states in favor of its
own.
2 The language of the act specifies only "that a person being within this state
is a material witness.... ." UNIFORM ACT To SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE STATE IN

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

§ 2.
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power exists anywhere to compel witnesses to proceed from one state
to another to testify, it must be in the state in which the witness is
present.
One of the primary objections to the Uniform Act is based on its
so-called extraterritorial effect, i.e., the witness is compelled to appear
before a proceeding outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court
which issues the order. It is submitted that this objection may be
overcome by following the rationale of courts acting in equity when
faced with similar problems.24 Modem cases have established that
in many situations a court of equity may require certain things to be
done beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction.2 5 The problem which
arises when one is required to perform an act in another state is
essentially one of enforcement. The court is not acting entirely extraterritorially, because at the time the witness is subpoenaed he is within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The future validity of the Uniform Act is certainly placed in jeopardy
by the decision in the principal case. Should other states choose to
follow this ruling, it may be almost impossible, as a practical matter,
to obtain the testimony of a witness who lives outside the state or who
has fled to another state to avoid giving testimony. The Federal Fugitive Felon Law, 28 passed in 1934, was intended to provide some relief
in this area in the absence of appropriate state legislation. This law
made it a felony to travel in interstate or foreign commerce in order
to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceeding. While this law
is certainly beneficial, it fails to provide an adequate solution to the
problem. Obviously it would be completely ineffective as to any
witness who had never entered the state conducting the prosecution or
investigation. Unless the states themselves are allowed to enforce
comprehensive legislation, there appears to be no effective means of
27
securing testimony from unwilling witnesses outside a state.
SHERWOOD H. SMITH, JR.
24

Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel

the Doing of Acts Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REV.
494 5(1930).
" Ibid. It has been recognized that in certain circumstances a court acting
in equity may (1) restrain proceedings instituted in a foreign tribunal, (2) decree
a conveyance of foreign lands, and (3) restrain or compel the doing of some act
outside the territorial limits of the state.
2618
U.S.C. § 1073 (1952).
"T At the time of this writing, certiorari has been granted by the United States
Supreme Court. Application of the People of the State of New York v. O'Neill,
356 U.S. 972 (1958). Also, motion made by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for leave to file brief as amicus curiae has been
granted. Application of the People of the State of New York v. O'Neill, 79 S.Ct.

19 (1958).
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Damages-Medical Expenses of Wife-Right of Husband to Recover
from Tort-feasor
The Supreme Court of Georgia recently held' the application of a
survival statute2 authorizing the recovery of medical, hospital, and
funeral expenses by the personal representative of a person killed by
crime or negligence, unconstitutional as to defendant. Decedent was
survived by her husband who had a common law cause of action8 against
the tort-feasor for medical and funeral expenses incurred as a result
of the injury unless the wife had so acted as to make her separate estate
liable for these expenses. The court held that the statute did not
repeal the husband's cause of action. Thus both the husband, in his
own right, and the administrator, by that statute, could maintain an
action to recover the same items of damages which, if permitted, would
subject the defendant to double liability. The court held that such a
result would violate the due process clause of both the state and the
Federal Constitutions.
What then is the law in respect to the rights and liabilities of husbands and wives for medical expenses 4 incurred by reason of the personal
injury to the wife ?5
At the common law, a wife in her own right had very few legally enforceable rights and liabilities. Upon her marriage all the wife's real
property came under the control of her husband, 6 and all her personal
property became, in effect, an outright gift to him;7 furthermore, she
was under a contractual disability.8 All her earnings,0 as well as any
damages recovered for injury to her person, 10 accrued to the husband.
It was the husband's duty, however, to support his wife and to provide
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 104 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 1958).
ANN. CODE § 105-1310 (1956).
Georgia R.R. and Banking Co. v. Tice, 124 Ga. 459, 52 S.E. 916 (1905) ; Lewis
v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756 (1886); Wrightsville & Tennille R.R. v. Vaughan, 9 Ga.
App. 371, 71 S.E. 691 (1911).
' Funeral expenses will not be considered in this Note. Partly because of varied
statutory provisions, the law governing them generally varies from the rules as
to medical expenses. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-1 (1950).
' It will be assumed in this Note that the husband and wife are living together
since, otherwise, the rights and liabilities of each spouse are governed by the type
and terms of their particular separation or divorce.
'it re Giant Portland Cement Co., 21 A.2d 697 (Del. Ch. 1941); Blood v.
Hunt, 97 Fla. 551, 121 So. 886 (1929) ; Turner v. Heinberg, 30 Ind. App. 615, 65
N.W. 294 (1902).
Woodworth v. Sweet, 51 N.Y. 8 (1865) ; Caffey v. Kelley, 45 N.C. 48 (1852).
' Jones v. Hamell, 110 Ga. 373, 35 S.E. 690 (1900); Stephens v. Hicks, 156
N.C. 239, 72 S.E. 313 (1911) ; Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8, 27 S.E. 998 (1897).
'Mock v. Neffer, 148 Ga. 25, 95 S.E. 673 (1918); Syme v. Riddle, 88 N.C.
463 (1883) ; Kee v. Vasser, 37 N.C. 553 (1843).
"0He must, however, take possession of them. Anderson v. Anderson, 74 Ky.
(11 Bush) 327 (1875) ; Southworth v. Packard, 7 Mass. 95 (1810).
1

'3 GA.
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her with the necessities of life" which, among other things, included
medical care.'12 Therefore, the expense of any reasonable and necessary
medical services rendered to the wife was a debt of her husband, whether
he assented to the' services or not.' 3 Since the liability was his, the
common law gave him a cause of action, in his own right, to recover
medical expenses proximately caused by the wrongful injury of his
wife by a third person. 14 This cause of action was separate and distinct from the cause of action for personal injuries to the wife which
includes such items of damages as pain and suffering. If the wife died,
all the rights arising in her and enforceable for her expired except where
preserved by statute; however, the right to recover the expenses incurred prior to her death, being in the husband alone, did not expire. 15
With the advance of civilization, and especially since the middle of
the nineteenth century, women have emerged from an inferior status and
gained equality with men in many respects. By statutes and by constitutional provisions married women have been granted in all 16 states some
or all of the following rights :7 to hold their own separate property
with little or no control by their husbands; to contract in their own right;
to retain their own earnings; and to sue and be sued alone. However,
a husband in all jurisdictions is still under the duty to support his wife
and to provide her with the necessities of life' 8 which, of course, include
medical care. The resulting rule is, therefore, that a wife may contract
for medical services and charge them against her separate estate; however, there must be an express contract to that effect by the wife, or there
must be facts and circumstances clearly showing that she intended to
bind her separate estate alone; otherwise, when medical services are
furnished the wife, the debt is upon the husband. 19 If he refuses to pay
"Kenyon v. Brightwell, 120 Ga. 606, 48 S.E. 124 (1904); Lyons v. Schanbacher, 316 Ill. 569, 147 N.E. 440 (1925) ; Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242,
84 S.E. 265 (1915).
1 Ematurdo v. Gordon, 100 Conn. 163, 123 Atl. 14 (1923) ; Fincher v. Davis,
108 S.E. 905 (Ga. App. 1921) ; Bowen v. Daugherty, supra note 11.
" Cothran v. Lee, 24 Ala. 380 (1854).
"'Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931);
Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 186 N.E. 632 (1933); Berger v. Jacobs, 21
Mich. 215 (1870); Richmond R. & Elec. Co. v. Bowles, 92 Va. 738, 24 S.E.
388 (1896) ; Wheeling v. Trowbridge, 5 W. Va. 353 (1872).
"Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867).
"MADDEN,

PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 111 (1931).

"See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 (secures the property of married women to
them) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1950) (authorizes married women to contract) ;
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1950) (authorizes married women to retain their
own earnings and damages for personal injury).
8 E.g., Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915).
See also
numerous cases cited in 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 15, p. 404, n. 91 (1944)

and 26 Am. JuL., Husband and Wife § 337, p. 934, n.v 16 (1940).
"Public

Util. Corp. v. Oliver, 64 F2d 60 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Kenyon v. Vogel,

250 Mass. 341, 145 N.E. 462 (1924); Galtney v. Wood, 149 Miss. 56, 115 So.
117 (1928); Bowen v. Daugherty, supra note 18; Hudock v. Youngstown, 164
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the creditor, and she pays, she may then sue her husband and recover
the amount so paid out by showing that the goods or services were
reasonable and necessary and that she expected him to assume liability.20
Some jurisdictions allow creditors who have supplied necessities to
the wife to recover from the wife, or her estate, if the husband is found
to be insolvent.21 Others view the solvency of either party immaterial,
and a creditor must take his luck against the one on whom the liability
lies under the facts.2 2 All jurisdictions allow recovery of medical expenses either by the person who is liable to the creditor for them, or by
the person who has in fact paid for them.2 A few states have statutes24
making the husband and wife jointly or severally liable to creditors for
goods and services,, including medical expenses, necessary for the support of the family. But it seems that as between the husband and wife,
the -husband is still primarily liable for necessities. 25 Since the wife
may be held liable for these necessities, she has accordingly been given
26
the right to recover her own medical expenses.
In North Carolina the common law is still in effect except where
provided otherwise by statute. 27 Since a husband must support his wife
and provide her with necessities, his right to recover medical expenses
caused by the wrongful injury of his wife seems to be still existent.28
Ohio St. 493, 132 N.E.2d 108 (1956); Lanzo v. Swift, 40 S.E.2d 811 (W. Va.
1946). See also, Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1189 (1930).
2 Cantiello v Cantiello, 136 Conn. 685, 74 A.2d 119 (1950); Kosanke v.
Kosanke, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N.W. 1060 (1917).
"it re Chevalier, 90 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Surr. Ct. 1949) ; In re Wilson's Estate,
160 Okla. 23, 15 P.2d 825 (1932).
" Grasser v. Anderson, 273 N.W. 63 (Wis. 1937).
"' Professor McCormick states the general rule: "Under modern statutes, which
confer on the-wife the power to bind her separate estate by contract, the husband's
duty to support and care nevertheless continues, and he may still recover for the
cost already incurred for her treatment, and she may not recover for this, unless
she has actually paid for such expense or has personally contracted to do so, in
such a manner as to bind her separate estate." McCoRaicic, DAMAGES 333-34
(1935). See also VADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC REOATioZs 158-63 (1931).
Contra, Woodward v. Des Moines, 182 Iowa 1102, 165 N.W. 313 (1917) ; Floyd
v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114 (1950) (4-3 decision) where wives were
allowed to recover medical expenses paid by their husbands due to wording of
statutes there involved.
" E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-10 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7308
(1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1936); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 519.05 (1947). As a typical example, see IowA CODE ANN. § 597.14 (1950) : "The
reasonable and necessary expenses of the family and the education of the children
are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them,
and2 in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or severally."
it re Kosanke's Estate, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N.W. 1060 (1917).
West Chicago St. Ry. v. Carr, 170 Ill. 748, 48 N.E. 992 (1897).

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 4-1 (1953).

No North Carolina case since the passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-2, -10,
infra notes 29 and 30, has been found squarely holding that a husband may recover
his direct expenses for the wrongful injury of the wife. However, the following
cases, indicate the court's recognition of the husband's right: Jyachosky v. Wensil,
240 N.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 644 (1954); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C.
821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
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However, the court's apparent interpretation of the controlling statutes,
G.S. §§ 52-229 and -10, 30 seems to have caused a rather liberal rule to
obtain in allowing wives to recover their medical expenses in personal
injury actions.
The first case arising after the passage of G.S. § 52-2 involving the
issue of medical expenses of the wife was Bowen v. Daugherty.5 ' This
was an action by the administrator of deceased wife seeking permission
to sell land in order to pay decedent's medical and funeral bills. Refusing
such permission, the court held that the statute did not remove the
husband's common law liability to support his wife and provide her
with necessities; and in absence of an express promise, or evidence
tending to show that credit was given to her, or facts or circumstances
making her exclusively or primarily liable, the debt was upon him.
There is a dictum3 2 to the effect that if the husband, in such cases, were
insolvent the court might allow a creditor to reach the wife or her estate.
In McDaniel v. Trent Mills, Inc.,3 3 the wife was suing tort-feasor for
medical expenses she allegedly incurred as a result of her husband's injuries. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer, and the
supreme court reversed, holding that she had stated a cause of action
for expenses incurred by her and expended out of her separate estate
made necessary by her husband's injuries.
In Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co.,3 4 the husband sued for consequential damages, not including medical expenses, due to the defendant's
negligent injury of his wife. The court decided that the husband had
lost his rights for consequential damages by virtue of G.S. § 52-10, which
authorized a wife to sue for "any damages for personal injuries or other
tort sustained by her." In defining the term "damages" under that
statute, the court stated that medical expenses were, inter alia, included therein; however, a wife's medical expenses were not at issue in
any of the cases cited 35 as authority for the definition, and thus, they
" "Subject to the provisions of § 52-12, regulating contracts of wife with husband affecting corpus or income of estate, every married woman is authorized to
contract and deal so as to affect her real and personal property in the same manner
and with the same effect as if she were unmarried. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2
(1950). This act, known as the Martin Act, was passed in 1911.
"o"The earnings of a married woman by virtue of any contract for her personal
service, and damages for personal injuries, or other tort sustained by her, can be
recovered by her suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and
separate property as fully as if she had remained unmarried." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-10 (1950). This act was passed in 1913.
31168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915).
32 Id. at 245, 84 S.E. at 267.

,3197 N.C. 342, 148 S.E. 440 (1929).
"224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
"Ledford

v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 614, 112 S.E. 421 (1922);

Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield, 178 N.C. 348, 100 S.E. 602 (1919) ; Price v. Charlotte
Elec. Ry., 160 N.C. 450, 76 S.E. 502 (1913).
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fail to support the unqualified listing of that item as proper damages
in the wife's action. Later, in Jyachosky v. Wensil,26 the Henstetler
case was cited as authority for the statement that "ordinarily, such
[medical] expenses are proper elements of damages in a wife's tort
'37
action.
If medical expenses are now a proper element of damages in the
wife's suit against tort-feasor, what has happened to the husband's
common law right to recover for these medical expenses? In the Bowen
case it was held that a husband was liable for the medical services to
his wife, absent her assumption of the debt. In McDaniel v. Trent
Mills, Inc., a wife, on whom no liability attaches by law, was allowed
to recover the medical expenses of her spouse by virtue of having paid
them. Surely, then, a husband, who is by law primarily liable for his
wife's medical expenses, may recover them from the tort-feasor absent
her sole assumption of the debt as considered in the Bowen case. But
has the court said otherwise by its definition in the Helmstetler case?
Or perhaps did the court make an over-generalization there? Taking
this definition declared by the court strictly, in North Carolina a married
woman in her personal injury action can recover her medical expenses,
unless, as intimated in Helmstetler,3 8 the husband sues and alleges
he was required to spend his own funds. If the state of the law is that
a married woman may recover by merely alleging" and proving that
medical expenses were incurred without the requirement that she allege
and prove that she either paid them out of her separate funds, or incurred the liability on her own credit, then one of two possibilities has
occurred: (1) defendants in such cases are subject t;i double liability,
or (2) the husband has lost his common law right to recover the medical expenses from the tort-feasor.
The first possibility was rendered unconstitutional as to the defendant in the principal case because double liability was imposed by
"37 240 N.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 644 (1954).
Id. at 227, 81 S.E.2d at 651.
" "It is not alleged that the plaintiff has expended any of his own funds in
consequence of the injuries negligently inflicted upon his wife. McDaniel v.
Trent Mills, supra." 224 N.C. at 825, 32 S.E.2d at 614. If the liability to the
medical creditor is on the husband then the determination of the wife's right to
recover should not depend on whether the husband has sued.
"E.g., In the Jyachosky case the complaint read: "11. As a result of the accident the plaintiff [a married woman] has incurred medical expenses in excess of
$1,500.00, and is informed and believes that the injuries will continue to require
medical treatment and will result in the incurring of additional medical expense
as long as plaintiff lives." Transcript of Record, p. 5, Jyachosky v. Wensil, 240
N.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 644 (1954).
It has been held that a married woman must allege the facts showing why
she, and not her husband, is entitled to the reovery of medical expenses in order
to introduce evidence on them. Wrightsville & T.R. Co. v. Vaughan, 9 Ga. App.
371, 71 S.E. 691 (1917); Brown v. Bell, 247 Mass. 437, 142 N.E. 93 (1924).
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In Jyachosky the court said that the defendant was prostatute.
tected from a double recovery by the fact that the husband of the plaintiff testified that the money used to pay the medical bills was, in effect,
hers, thus having estopped himself from claiming otherwise should he
later attempt to sue. If the husband should refrain from any participation in his wife's action, and the defendant paid damages for which the
husband may later prove himself entitled, what is there to prevent
the husband from recovering also?
The second possibility, the abrogation of the husband's common law
right to recover the wife's medical expenses from the tort-feasor, is
manifestly unfair to husbands since the primary liability for these
medical expenses still remains on him. Consequently, the medical creditor, who has not been a party4 ' to the case of "wife v. tort-feasor," can
sue the husband. Thus it would seem that the husband has a liability
without the concurrent right to indemnify himself from the wrong-doer.
Of course, no serious problem as to who gets the recovery, or who
pays the medical bill arises in the normal situation where the husband
and wife are living together harmoniously; however, the situation could
be quite different. For instance, the wife having recovered a substantial
judgment may decide this is the chance to leave husband, an uncommon
but not unheard of possibility. Or if the wife has died, an administrator
may be appointed and allowed to recover from the tort-feasor, regardless
of whether the husband has paid or is liable for the medical bills. When
it is remembered that personal injury recoveries are a general asset of
the decedent's estate2 and that medical debts are in the sixth order of
priority,4 then the husband may have a legitimate concern if the estate
,oIf the Helinstetler definition is strictly followed, namely, that the right to
recover medical expenses is in the wife, then the North Carolina court may find
itself faced with the same problem that was faced by the Georgia court in the
principal case. That is, there exists in the wife a statutory cause of action for
medical expenses while at the same time the husband's common law right for
these same damages is evidently unaffected. Thus,. it is submitted that the application of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1950), as construed in Helnstetrer, would be unconstitutional
as applied to the tort-feasor when sued for medical expenses.
1
The medical creditor may, however, avail himself of a lien. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 44-49, -50 (1950), provide that a lien may be placed by a medical creditor
upon any recovery for personal injury where the person so recovering is indebted
for the medical services and supplies. G.S. § 44-49 requires that the lien be filed
in the clerk of the court's office within 30 days after the filing of the suit in order to
be valid. G.S. § 44-50 provides for cases of out of court settlement, but the writer
believes it is of doubtful value in that the statutory duty is directed at the person
receiving the settlement. Obviously, the statute was intended to assist medical
creditors to collect from the poor and from those whose practice of paying their
debts is in doubt. If the medical creditor cannot be on hand immediately after
the settlement with such persons, he is likely never to see the money. The writer
suggests that if the statutory duty were shifted to the person or corporation making
the settlement, the statute would be more effective.
" Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 332, 38 S.E.2d 105 (1946).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-105 (1950).
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is not amply solvent to cover the other debts. To be deprived of his
recourse against the tort-feasor in such cases could be a grave financial
blow to the husband. On the other hand, if the husband and the wife
both are allowed separate recoveries for the same medical expenses,
the defendant is forced to pay twice.
No North Carolina case has been found which is decisive on the
point discussed in this Note, and while trends suggesting contrary possibilities have been explored, it is submitted that the North Carolina position is that only when the injured plaintiff-wife has paid the medical
bills with her own funds, or is solely liable therefor, may she recover
them from the tort-feasor; otherwise, the husband on whom the liability
falls may recover.
JAmES S. DOCKERY, JR.
Evidence-Admissibility in Federal Prosecution Where Procured by
State Authorized Wire Tapping
In Benanti v. United States,' the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2 and held
that evidence obtained as the result of state authorized wire tapping by
New York law enforcement officers, even though without participation
by federal officials, was inadmissible in federal courts.8
In the Supreme Court the Government attempted to justify admission of the evidence on the basis of Schwartz v.Texas 4 and by drawing an analogy to fourth amendment cases in which evidence illegally
procured by state officers acting in their own behalf and without federal
participation was admissible in federal prosecutions. 5
In the Schwartz case the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained
by wire tapping by state officials was admissible in state courts. The
Court in the Benanti case distinguished the Schwartz case on the ground
that in the latter "due regard to federal-state relations precluded the
conclusion that Congress intended to thwart a state rule of evidence in
In the Benanti case
the absence of a clear indication to that effect."
'355 U.S. 96 (1957).
'Benanti v. United States, 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957).
'The wire tapping was by state officials who had obtained a warrant in accordance with state law authorizing the wire tapping.

The petitioner was suspected

of violating the New York narcotics laws. When the state officers made their

arrest, they found the petitioner was not transporting narcotics in violation of
state law, but was transporting nontaxed alcohol in violation of federal law. Evi-

dence of this violation was turned over to federal authorities who began this

prosecution. Although the New York police were acting pursuant to state law,
N.Y. CoxsT. art. 1, § 12; N.Y. CoDz CRim. PROC. § 813-a (1942), both the court
of appeals and the Supreme Court found they violated section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).

'344 U.S. 199 (1952).
aIbid.

5355 U.S. at 101.
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the state's side of the federal-state conflict was not as compelling as in
Schwartz, for in Benanti the problem was whether in a federal prosecution a state statute required the Court to refuse to implement the prohibition of a federal law. Since it had been held in an earlier case 7 that
section 605 was applicable to intrastate as well as to interstate communications and since section 605 is not limited to federal agents, but
also applies to state officials, 8 the state law authorizing wire tapping was
manifestly contrary to controlling federal law. 9 In the Schwartz case
the Court was not faced with the relatively simpler problem of a conflict
between state and federal legislation in a field in which Congress was
authorized to act, but with the problem of the effect to be given to vi9lation of a federal statute in state proceedings. Although admitting a violation of section 605 occurred in the state tribunal, 10 the Court held
that section 605 would not be construed to bar the evidence in the
absence of a clear intent on the part of Congress to impose a rule of
evidence upon state courts. In so holding the Court avoided a construction of the statute which would have raised the constitutional
question of whether Congress had the authority under the commerce
clause to invade the police power of the states in determining the admissibility of evidence in state courts.- Since the Benanti case involved a federal prosecution and, therefore, did not present the same
grave problem in federal-state relations, the Court did not hesitate to
distinguish it from the Schwartz case.
The decision in Benanti is particularly significant in that the lower
federal courts in cases arising under the fourth amendment have admitted evidence illegally obtained by state and other nonfederal officials
acting in their own behalf and turned over to federal authorities when
2
the latter did not participate in the wrongdoing.'
'Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
' See Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), involving state law enforcement
officers, and in which the Court acknowledged that the divulgence of the wire
tapping by these state officials was a violation of Section 605.
0 355 U.S. at 105, where the Court stated: "[W]e find that Congress, setting out
a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state legislation which would
contradict that section... ." In In re Telephone Communications, 9 Misc. 2d 121,
170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958), it was held that any future applications for
orders authorizing interceptions of telephone messages within New York would be
denied
on the ground that Benanti held such orders to be contrary to federal law.
10344 U.S. at 201.
" See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 599 (1904), where the Court said:
"[I]t is within the established power of the State to prescribe the evidence which
is to be received in the courts of its own government." See also Scott, Federal
Restrictions on Evidence in State Criminal Cases, 34 MINN. L. Rav. 489, 50708 (1950).
"2Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954); Jaroshuk v. United
States, 201 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1953). See Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Search and Seimire, 19 ILL. L. REv. 303 (1925).
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The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures.' 8 The Supreme Court has taken
the position that evidence secured in violation of the fourth amendment
is not admissible in federal courts if federal officers participated in the
illegal search and seizure.' 4 Exclusion of such evidence rests upon a
court created rule of evidence designed to implement this amendment's
prohibition.1 5 In the Benanti case the Court, citing Lustig v. United
States,'" stated that the question of whether evidence illegally obtained
by state officials is admissible in the federal courts is an open one
in the Supreme Court.17 Although this question has not been decided
by the Supreme Court, the Court has on several occasions used language
indicating that evidence secured by state officers would be admissible ;18
and in Burdeau v. McDowell19 the Court held that evidence secured
in an illegal search by a private detective was admissible in a federal
prosecution. As previously stated, the lower federal courts, to which
the question has been presented on several occasions, have generally
admitted the evidence. 20
The lower court realized that wire tapping did not involve a violation of the fourth amendment and that evidence secured by wire tapping
was admissible until passage of the Federal Communications Act.21
Howeyer, the court of appeals, believing there should be no distinction
between the policy as to state procured evidence in violation of the
fourth amendment and that procured by state officers in violation of the
22
Federal" Communications Act, held the evidence was admissible.
1

1U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
"'Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
(concurring opinion). See
1 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949)
Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized
Evidence, 15 So. CAIir. L. REv. 60 (1941).
10338 U.S. 74 (1949).
11355 U.S. at 102, n.10.
18 See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), where the Court said:
"[W]e do not question the right of the federal government to avail itself of evidence improper& seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account." Id. at 33.
10256 U.S. 465 (1921).
20 See note 12 supra.
"' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In the Ohnstead case
the defendant contended that wire tapping was an unreasonable search and seizure
and that evidence so obtained by federal officials was not admissible in the federal
courts. The Court rejected this contention on the ground that the fourth amendment was not violated unless there was a search or seizure of one's person or
papers or an actual physical invasion of one's home. It was not until several years
after the Ohnstead decision that Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act,
48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952). The pertinent part of the statute
is as follows: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
-communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person."
2 Benanti v. United States, 244 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1957).
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On appeal the Supreme Court found that it was neither appropriate
nor necessary to delve into an analogy between the Communications Act
and the fourth amendment and decided the case solely on the basis of
the statute. 23
The plain meaning of the statute2 4 supports the decision of the
Supreme Court and justifies the refusal to admit evidence secured by wire
tapping regardless of the policy in the lower federal courts in fourth
amendment cases. Whereas the United States Constitution protects
individuals only from illegal searches and seizures conducted by federal
officials and not from such acts by state officials, 25 except in instances
where the latter are guilty of such gross misconduct as to deprive the
aggrieved party of due process, 26 the Communications Act by its express terms makes no distinction between federal and state officials.
Another factor calling for a reversal of the conviction was that at the
very moment the state official "divulged" the "existence" of the wire
tapping to the jury he violated the Communications Act.27 The conviction, said the Court, was "brought about in part by a violation of
federal law, in this case in federal court." 28 Accordingly, the Court
held that the express prohibition in the statute was a bar to the conviction.
E. M. PATURIS
102.
" See note 21 supra.
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), where the Court stated: "[T]he
notion that the 'due process of law' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is
shorthand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has been rejected by this Court again and again ... ." Id. at 26.
2'The Court has made the following statement as to the limitations imposed on
the states by the fourteenth amendment: "[T]his clause extracts from the States
.all that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'." Id. at.27.
27 After pointing out that section 605 contains an express prohibition against
the divulgence of the existence of an interception, the Court said: "[D]isclosure of
the existence of the communication was the prejudicial error that was not overcome." 355 U.S. at 101, n. 6. On the basis of this statement it would seem that
the primary reason for forbidding the evidence secured by the wire tapping was
revelation of the existence of the interception in court. But the Court explicitly
reserved what conclusion it would have reached had the divulgence been out of
court. "The first divulgence appearing on the record occurred in court, but we
do not mean to imply that an out-of-court violati6n of the statute would not also
lead to the invalidation of a subsequent conviction." Id. at 102, n. 9. Apparently
a divulgence out of court would also lead to a reversal of any conviction. In
Benanti the Court said that evidence acquired by wire tapping should not be
-sed at all. This could be construed as meaning that regardless of where the
violation occurs, the Court will implement the prohibition of the Federal Communications Act by excluding such evidence. This would not be a new step, since
as stated previously, this is the policy as to evidence secured by federal officials in
violation of the fourth amendment. However, since the Communications Act is not
limited only to federal officials as is the fourth amendment, evidence obtained in
violation of the former would probably be excluded regardless of who violated the
statute.
23355 U.S. at

28Id. at 102.
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Life Insurance-Effect of Homicide Exclusion in Double Indemnity
Clause
The recent case of Goldberg v. United Life and Acc. Ins. Co.' indicates a trend toward a new interpretation and construction of double
indemnity clauses in life insurance policies. The facts were as follows:
the insured and another gentleman were observed in discussion in a
social club; the insured apparently addressed harsh and profane words
to his companion; the companion thereupon struck the insured with his
fist; the insured fell backward, striking his head on a concrete floor and
suffering a concussion from which he died a short time later.
The defendant company earlier had issued to the insured certain life
insurance policies containing double indemnity clauses.2 Plaintiff, the
wife of the insured, had been named beneficiary. The defendant company immediately paid to the plaintiff the total face value of the policies,
but refused to pay double indemnity, basing its refusal on two grounds:
(1) the insured did not meet his death by accidental means within the
coverage of the policies, and (2) the insured's death resulted from
"homicide," a cause of death expressly excluded from the double indemnity insuring agreements.
As to the defendant's first ground, the court conceded, without deciding, that the evidence was sufficient to show prima facie that the insured met his death through accidental means within the insuring provisions of the policy. Of necessity, in every case which turns on exclusions from a double indemnity provision the court must reach this
conclusion, since there can be no recovery of double indemnity in any
event if death does not result from accidental means. Although this
presents a problem of real significance in many fact situations, the better
reasoned authorities apparently would support the court's conclusion
on this set of facts. 8
'248 N.C. 86, 102 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
'The pertinent stipulation read: "The United Life and Accident Insurance
'Company ... promises to pay Double Indemnity . . in the event that such death
should result directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury
effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means . . . provided suich
death shall not have resulted from homicide .... " (Emphasis added.)
' To determine whether a death results solely from accidental means, the situation must be considered from the viewpoint of the one killed. Releford v. Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 228, 276 S.W.2d 517 (1955). The assailant can act intentionally and the death still result solely from accidental means. Black v.
Massachusetts Acc. Co., 57 ILI. 237, 189 At. 3 (1937). Although an injury may be
intentionally inflicted by another, nevertheless, if the injury was not naturally to be
foreseen by the insured, death results from accidental means within the meaning of
a double indemnity provision. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Distretti, 159 Tenn. 138,
17 S.W.2d 11 (1929). But, "where the insured is the aggressor in a personal encounter and commits an assault upon another with demonstration of violence and
knows, or under the circumstances should reasonably anticipate, that he will be
in danger of great bodily harm as the natural and probable consequence of his act
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However, the court affirmed a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint
on the second ground, holding that the evidence disclosed conclusively
that the insured met his death by "homicide" within the meaning of the
exclusion in the policy. This was true despite the fact that the companion, in striking the blow, had no intent to kill.
Technically, the decision is correct when considered in view of the
broad legal definition of the word "homicide'-the killing of one human
being by another human being. 4 Nevertheless, the court in this decision
seemingly has gone further than any other reported American case,
although a careful analysis of the reported decisions will disclose a trend
toward construing the provision "homicide" liberally in favor of insurance companies.
The situation most obviously included as a homicide is the one in
which the insured is the victim of a felonious intentional killing amounting to first degree murder. The insurance company, of course, is not
liable in such a situation. 5 Also, where the insured is killed incident to
the commission of a felony the courts seem to agree that death results
from "homicide" within the meaning of the policy exclusion. 6 Such a
killing is first degree murder under the felony-murder rule. However,
where the killing is done by an insane person, the courts early developed
....

his injury or death may not be regarded as caused by accidental means."

Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 505, 94 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1956).

However, "even where it appears the insured is the aggressor in an altercation,
his ensuing death may be held as [resulting from accidental means] ... provided
it also appears the insured was in such mental condition that he could not reasonably
anticipate he would be in danger of great bodily harm as a probable consequence of
his acts." Newton v. Colonial Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 113, 115
(E.D.N.C. 1957).
It would seem clear that in the principal case the insured would not have had
reason to anticipate that death would result from his calling his companion a vile
name. Death would not be the natural and probable consequence of that act. Thus,
death can be said to have resulted solely from accidental means.
'Black v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., supra note 3. "Homicide includes both
intentional and unintentional killing. It is justifiable when committed by an officer
in the discharge of duty . . . excusable when committed accidentally or in self defense, felonious when committed maliciously ... or negligently as in manslaughter."
Great So. Life Ins. Co. v. Akins, 105 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
See also State v. Williams, 231 N.C. 214, 56 S.E.2d 574 (1949) ; State v. Satterfield,
198 N.C. 682, 153 S.E. 155 (1930); State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945
(1905) ; State v. Turnage, 138 N.C. 566, 49 S.E. 913 (1905).
'United Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Willoughby, 182 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1950) (insured killed when his house was intentionally dynamited); Lloyd v. Unity Life
Ins. Co., 225 La. 585, 73 So. 2d 470 (1954) (insured stabbed by assailant) ; Great
So. Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 24 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (insured intentionally murdered without provocation).
'McLendon v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 557, 31 S.E.2d 429 (1944)
(insured beaten to death by a robber) ; Langvin v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., 338 Ill.
App. 499, 88 N.E.2d 111 (1949) (insured beaten to death by burglars); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tabb, 273 Ky. 649, 117 S.W.2d 587 (1938) (insured's head smashed by robber) ; Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
288 Mich. 612, 286 N.W. 99 (1939) (insured shot while resisting robbery of'filling
station) ; Black v. MWassachusetts Acc. Co., 57 R.I. 237, 189 Atl. 3 (1937) (insured,
killed in robbery attempt).
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an exception to the rule of non-liability of an insurance company. 7 These
decisions are based on the theory that the word "homicide" as used in
the policy was not intended to be given its broad meaning by the parties,
but was intended to include intentional homicide only.8 This would
exclude murders by insane persons 9 since they cannot be said to possess
the requisite intent.' 0
Many courts in cases not involving insane persons have held that
the term "homicide" as used in these policies must be construed as
meaning only intentional homicides. 1 The case most nearly contra
to the decision in the principal case is Seaboard Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy.' 2 In that case the assailant, thinking the insured had insulted him,
made a harsh remark to him. The insured did not intend to strike the
assailant but assumed such an attitude of defense that the assailant
might reasonably have thought he had such intent. The assailant struck
the insured with his fist causing him to fall backward and to crush
his head on a cement floor. The court held that death resulted solely
through external, violent, and accidental means and did not ensue as a
result of "homicide." The court felt that the term as used in the policy
embraced only intentional killings. In the Seaboard case the assailant
did not intend to kill the insured and employed no means reasonably
calculated to cause death. The assailant was guilty at most of simple
assault.'3 This case is not readily distinguishable from the principal
case.
. Great So. Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 148 Miss. 173, 114 So. 262 (1927)
(insured shot by insane person without any provocation or legal justification);
Day v. Interstate Life and Acc. Co., 163 Tenn. 190, 42 S.W.2d 208 (1931)(insured killed by insane man with axe) ; Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Plunkett, 75 S.W.2d
31.3 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (insured shot by insane man).
"The courts generally hold that the word 'intentional' must be read into the
contract, and the company is exempt from liability only Where the homicide was an
intentional one." Day v. Interstate Life and Acc. Co., 163 Tenn. 190, 192, 42
S,W 2d 208, 208 (1931).
.!The possibility of such a construction has led some insurance companies to
adopt a more inclusive wording.. The life policy in Great So. Life Ins. Co. v.
Akins, 105 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), had a clause providing for double
irndennity for death resulting from accidental means except where death resulted
from "intentional or unintentional homicide due to the act of a sane or insane
person." (Emphasis added.)
"o Cases cited note 7 .ypra. In cases turning on a "homicide" exclusion, the
courts make no mention of the fact that an insane person may intend to do the
very act which causes death and yet not have the requisite intent to kill necessary
for a cririjinal conviction. Such a distinction has been drawn where the exclusion
was for "injuries intentionally inflicted by another person." Deloache v. Carolina
Life. Ins. Co., 104 S.E.2d 875 (S.C. 1958).. However, this would seem to be a
definite minority view. See 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTIC § 482
( 1941)..
• See, e.g., Walters v. Great Nat'l Life Ins., Co., 132 Tex. 454, 124 S.W.2d
850.,(1939).
"134 Tex. 165, 132 S.W.2d 393 (1939).
&( This would be true in Texas, at least. See, e.g., Flournog v. State, 124 Tex.
ciin. '395, 63 S.W.2d 558 (1933).
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The case most nearly in accord with the decision in the principal
case, and the one relied upon by the North Carolina court, is United
Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prostic.14 There the insured died of heart
failure resulting from a beating inflicted by robbers. The facts were
such as to raise the inference that death was not intended by the robbers.
The court denied recovery on the ground that death resulted from
"homicide" within the meaning of the exclusion from the double indemnity clause. It was decided that the word "homicide" could not
reasonably be restricted to mean only intentional killings, for thiswould
eliminate many manslaughters and also many first and second degr~e
murders; especially under the felony-murder rule or where death was
substantially likely to follow from the course of action pursued.
This case is distinguishable from the principal case in that in the
Prostic case the killing dearly would be first degree murder under the
felony-murder rule. In the principal case the companion had no intent
to kill the insured, the felony-murder rule would not be applicable, and
it would seem, at most, that he might be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Perhaps the strongest ground of attack upon the decision in the
principal case is its disregard of certain fundamental principles of insurance contract construction. It is said that an insurance contract
should be interpreted according to its plain meaning--even that meaning accorded to the words by the man on the street. 16 It is submitted
that, among laymen, an accidental killing amounting at most to involuntary manslaughter is not generally considered "homicide." Also,
where provisions are uncertain or ambiguous they should be interpreted
most favorably to the insured and construed most strongly against the
insurer.17
"169 Md. 535, 182 Atl. 421 (1936).
Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 Mich. 612, 286 N.W. 99
(1939).
" Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947) ; Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co. v. Casualty Underwriters, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. Minn. 1955); Weissman v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; Lingo v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 32 Ala,
App. 525, 27 So. 2d 697, cert. denied, 248 Ala. 367, 27 So. 2d 700 (1946) ; Arenson
v. National Automobile and Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955);
Johnson v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 234 N.C. 25, 65 S.E.2d 347 (1951).
'"
Mah See v. North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421, 213 Pac. 42 (1923);
McLendon v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 557, 31 S.E.2d 429 (1944);
Langvin v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., 338 Ill.
App. 499, 88 N.E.2d 111 (1949);
Hooper v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 318 Mich. 384, 28 N.W.2d 331 (1947) ;
Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 Mich. 612, 286 N.W. 99 (1939) ;
Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305 (1955) ; General Acc.,
Fire, and Life Assurance Corp. v. Hymes, 77 Okla. 20, 185 Pac. 1085 (1919).
However, there is a definite argument contra, that where a word has a clear and
well recognized legal meaning, it should not be perverted merely to benefit the
insured. Langvin v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., supra; McLendon v. Carolina Life
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However, the North Carolina decision, whatever one may think of
iton its facts, poses an even more serious question: will the construciion of the word "homicide" be extended to include negligent killings
of one human being by another? An example of such a situation would
be where death is caused by the negligent operation of an automobile.
The technical legal definition of the word clearly would include such an
extension. I8 It would be but a short step from the present North Carolina decision to a holding that there was a "homicide" where death
resulted from gross negligence in a situation amounting to involuntary
manslaughter. The Maryland court has suggested that the definition of
"homicide" not be extended to include deaths resulting from negligent
acts, but that it should be restricted to deaths resulting from voluntary
acts. Should the North Carolina court refuse to follow the Maryland
view, but choose instead to extend the definition of "homicide" to include
death resulting from negligence, a double indemnity clause would be
worthless in a large number of cases. Carried to its furthest extreme,
only those persons dying from such natural causes as flood or lightning
would be able to recover double indemnity. Whether this would be a
desirable consequence or not, the public and the legal profession are
entitled to be made aware of the dangers involved. It would seem that
if insurance companies desire to be absolved from liability where death
results from unintentional or negligent homicides, they should so specify
in their policies. 19 Perhaps definitive legislation is needed in this area.

THaOMAS W. W~aRiCK
Taxation-Estate Tax-Charities-Gifts to Bar Associations
Testator bequeathed $5,000 to the Rhode Island Bar Association to
be used "for the advancement and upholding of those standards of the
profession which are assumed by the members upon their admission to
the Bar, and for the prosecution and punishment of those members who
Ins. Co., supra; Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., stpra

Compare

in connection with both points of view this statement: "A policy of insurance and
every clause and part thereof is the contract, and, like all contracts, should be
construed so as to effectuate the real purpose and intention of the parties, giving
to the language employed, when unambiguous, its ordinary and usually accepted
meaning." Frontier Mortgage Corp. v. Heft, 146 Md. 1, 12, 125 AtI. 772, 776
(1924).
28 "An intention to kill the victim is not, of course, an essential of homicide
in its ordinary and usually accepted meaning. There are accidental homicides,
and homicides by misadventure, or involuntary manslaughter, as they are sometimes called, in which there is no intention to kill or harm at all." United Life
and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 538, 182 Atl. 421, 422 (1936).
1" See note 9 supra.
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violate their obligations to the court and to the public."' His executor
sought to recover the federal estate tax assessed on the transfer, alleging
that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue erroneously refused to allow
a deduction under section 812(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of
19392 as a transfer for charitable purposes. The district court held that
it was immaterial whether the Association was organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes because the testator had manifested a clear intention to create an
express trust to be used for the limited purposes specified. In deciding
that these purposes were charitable,5 the court pointed out that the
proper operation of our judicial system as well as the safeguarding
of personal and property rights depends upon the maintenance of high
ethical standards by the legal profession. In the absence of evidence
that a substantial part of the activities of the Association involved the
attempt to influence legislation, such a gift in trust qualified for the
charitable deduction under the estate tax statute. 4
1 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 204, 205
(D.R.I. 1958).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(d), as amended, 61 STAT. 6 (1947) (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055). Pertinent provisions are the following: "§ 812. Net
estate
"For the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined, in
the case of a citizen or resident of the United States by deducting from the value
of the gross estate'C

"(d) Transfers for public, charitable, and religious uses. The amount of all bequests, legacies, devises, or transfers . . . to or for the use of any corporation
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private stockholder or individual, and no substantial part of the activities
of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, or to a trustee or trustees ... but only if such contributions or gifts are to be
used by such trustee or trustees ... exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes . . . and no substantial part of the activities of
such trustee or trustees . . . is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation . .. ."
' There are obvious difficulties in attempting to define the term "charity."
ZOLLMANN, CuARiTiEs §§ 185, 187 (1924).
The court selected as a guide the
definition of a charitable gift used in United States v. Proprietors of Social Law
Library, 102 F.2d 481, 483 (1st Cir. 1939), viz., "any gift not inconsistent with
existing laws, which is promotive of science, or tends to the education or enlightenment, benefit, or amelioration of the condition of mankind, or the diffusion of
useful knowledge, or is for public convenience . . . . Missouri Historical Soc'y v.
Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 466, 8 S.W. 346, 348 (1888)."
'Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 204 (D.R.I.
1958). Accord, it re Estate of Quinlan, 233 Minn. 35, 45 N.W.2d 807 (1951).
Here a bequest to a foundation was held to be exempt from a state inheritance tax.
The court determined that it was the testatrix's intent to create a trust for charitable purposes; therefore the status of the foundation was immaterial. But see
Alfred A. Cook, 30 B.T.A. 292 (1934). Here a contribution to the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York to be used by a special investigating committee
was held not to be deductible for federal income tax purposes. The Association
had intervened in a grand jury investigation of alleged irregularities in the
administration of the bankruptcy laws. As a result of the investigation, procedural
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In determining the nature of the legal interest created, the court
resorted to local law in accordance with the rule that state law is binding
as to what legal interests are created, while the federal revenue acts
govern what interests, so created, shall be taxedY Rhode Island follows the general rule that no particular words are necessary to create
an express charitable trust and that the absence of the words "trust" or
"trustee" is immaterial. It is sufficient if there is a manifestation of an
intention that the property should be held subject to a legal obligation to
devote it to purposes which are charitable.0 In concluding that this
was a gift to the members of the Association as trustees, the court
recognized the distinction between the public, which is the real beneficiary of a charitable trust, and the human beings who are the mere
7
conduits of the social benefits to the public.
It has been asserted that deductions are allowed under the federal
estate tax provisions when the object of the charity would likewise be
a proper object for the expenditure of the proceeds of taxation; whereas
formerly, charity was considered almost anything which tended to promote the well being of mankind. 8 When such bequests are devoted to
objectives which otherwise would be accomplished at public expense,
their deduction from taxation is not a matter of grace but an act of
justice. 9 Furthermore the purpose of the deduction provisions is to
encourage gifts for such objectives.10 The maintenance of the standards
of the legal profession and the prosecution and punishment of those members who violate their professional obligations are proper subjects for
the expenditure of public money.- Therefore a gift in trust for such
purposes should qualify for the charitable deduction.
Earlier, in Dulles v. Johnson,'2 a district court held that an absolute
bequest to three New York bar associations was not deductible for
federal estate tax purposes. In this case the court determined that
reforms were instituted and disciplinary action taken against certain attorneys. The
petitioner's claim that his contribution was a gift to a trust fund was rejected
on the grounds that the committee was neither a trust nor a fund, and that the
Association was not a tax exempt charitable organization under provisions of
section 23 (n) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 791.
'Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
' Wood v. Hartigan, 59 R.I. 333, 195 Atl. 507 (1937) ; Tillinghast v. Boy Scouts
of America, 47 R.I. 406, 133 At. 662 (1926) ; 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 45
(2d7 ed. 1951) ; 1 ScorT, TRUSTS § 24 (2d ed. 1956).
2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 362 (2d ed. 1953).
'Rockefeller, How to Get Maximum Benefits from Gifts and Bequests to
Charity, in 1 ESTATE TAX TEciaNIQuEs f447 (Lasser ed. 1955).
'Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Eaton, 20 F.2d 419, 421 (D. Conn. 1927);
1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Grr TAX § 12.04 (1942).
" Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank v. Henricksen, 46 F. Supp. 831, 834 (W.D. Wash.
1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1944); Knoernschild v. Commissioner, 97
F.2d 213, 214 (7th Cir. 1938).
" See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 84 (1958) (Incorporated state bar act).
" 155 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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these associations were non-charitable organizations since (1) they
existed primarily for the benefit of their members, as distinguished from
the public, and (2) a.substantial part of their activities was aimed at
attempting to influence legislation in violation of the statutory restriction.' 3 The court admitted however, that many of the activities of these
organizations were charitable, scientific, literary, or educational.
In the same case, the court held that a bequest to the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York "for its library and for research and
exposition in law, and for other legal purposes" did not qualify for the
charitable deduction since, as previously determined, such an organization was non-charitable.
The court dismissed the argument that the latter bequest was a gift
in trust for educational purposes because of the absence of express trust
wording and a clearly limited charitable purpose. The New York courts
follow the general rule that no express words are necessary to create a
trust when such an intention is clearly manifested.1 4 Furthermore they
have been liberal in construing bequests as trusts when there is a gift for
charitable uses.15
A gift in trust to a bar association for the preservation of the books
in its law library has been held to be deductible for federal estate tax
purposes as a transfer for exclusively literary and educational purposes.,
"In arriving at this conclusion, the court pointed out that the characterization
of an organization by the state of its incorporation was entitled to weight in the
absence of federal characterization. United States v. Proprietors of Social Law
Library, 102 F.2d 481, 483 (1st Cir. 1939). The Brooklyn Bar Association, with
a similarly worded certificate of incorporation, had been denied exemption from
payment of a state employment tax on the grounds that it was not organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or literary purposes. Smith
v. Brooklyn Bar Ass'n, 266 App. Div. 1038, 44 N.Y.S.2d 620 (3d Dep't 1943),
aff'd sub norn. Claim of Smith, 292 N.Y. 593, 55 N.E.2d 368 (1944). According
to its certificate, the Association was incorporated for the purpose of cultivating
the science of jurisprudence, promoting reforms in the law, facilitating the administration of justice, elevating the standards of integrity, honor, and courtesy
in the legal profession, and cherishing the spirit of brotherhood among the members thereof.
1" See, e.g., In re Babbage's Estate, 201 Misc. 750, 106 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Surr. Ct.
1951).
" In re Hendricks' Will, 1 Misc. 2d 904, 148 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1955),
,aff'd, 3 A.D.2d 890, 161 N.Y.S.2d 855 (4th Dep't 1957) ; In re Andrejevich's Estate,
57 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Surr. Ct. 1945) ; In the Mattter of Durbrow, 245 N.Y. 469, 477,
157 N.E. 747, 749 (1929); Manley v. Fiske, 139 App. Div. 665, 124 N.Y. Supp.
149, 151 (1st Dep't 1910) ("a trust is almost inseparably involved with a gift for
charitable uses") ; Bowman v. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Soc'y, 182 N.Y.

494, 75 N.E. 535 (1905).
"Elizabeth L. Audenried, 26 T.C. 120 (1956).

Here the court held that the

status of the bar association wvas immaterial. Exclusion from the use of the library
of members not paying their dues and nonmembers not paying a fee was held to
be reasonable. Such rules were held not to affect the purpose of the library and
were similar to the rules requiring the payment of tuition at tax exempt educational institutions.
A law library to which use was restricted to subscribers and certain federal
court officials was held to be exempt from a federal capital stock tax as an educa-
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Likewise, "research and exposition in law" could be characterized as an
educational purpose. However, "for other legal purposes" does appear
uncertain. It is elementary that a trust for charity and private purposes
with no division of capital must fail for uncertainty.17 Whether the
term "other legal purposes" was meant to be limited to charity is a question of interpretation of the testator's intentions. If it is so limited,
a charitable trust is created.' 8 It is reasonable to assume that the
testator intended the term "other legal purposes" to mean other purposes
of the same type expressly enumerated, i.e., literary and educational.
By application of the ejusdem generis rule it would seem that a charitable
10
trust was created and therefore that the deduction should be allowed.
In Dulles v. Johnson, a bequest to the William Nelson Cromwell
Foundation for Research of the Law and Legal History of the Colonial
Period of the United States of America, a trust established by the decedent, was held to be deductible for federal estate tax purposes. In
characterizing the Foundation, the court looked at the only evidence of
its character available, its indenture and expenditures. After deciding
that the purposes listed in the indenture were not clearly disqualifying,2"
the court stated that where a trust is involved the organization of the
trust is not an important criterion. Implying that the determining factor
is the actual use of the trust funds, the court held that in view of the
tional institution. United States v. Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102 F.2d
481 (1st Cir. 1939). In this case the court asserted that the public received both
direct and indirect benefit from the library because attorneys using the library could
subject to the widest possible examination and study all cases arising in their
practice. "To permit the public to use the Social Law Library indiscriminately
would greatly lessen its benefits to those qualified to obtain the greatest benefits
from its use, since it must be a place devoted to study. Quiet is essential to serving
its purpose. Hence the reason for excluding law students and restricting the users
within reasonable limits." Id. at 482.
"Matter of Shattuck, 193 N.Y. 446, 86 N.E. 455 (1908) ; 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRusTEEs § 372 (2d ed. 1953); 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 398 (2d ed. 1956).
" RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 398, comment d (1935).

For applications of the rule in similar situations, see Prime v. Harmon,
120 Me. 299, 113 Atl. 738 (1921) (bequest in trust for a missionary society and aid
society, and "other moral and useful associations" upheld on the grounds that the
other associations were meant to be of the same type as those previously named) ;
Coffin v. Attorney General, 231 Mass. 579, 121 N.E. 397 (1919) (bequest to missions
"and like good objects" held to be entirely charitable); Matter of Cunningham,
206 N.Y. 601, 100 N.E. 437 (1912) (bequest to trustees to be "applied to charitable
and benevolent associations and institutions of learning" upheld on the grounds that
the words "charitable and benevolent were intended to qualify the word "institutions") ; Matter of Robinson, 203 N.Y. 380, 96 N.E. 925 (1911) ; Staines v. Burton,
17 Utah 331, 53 Pac. 1015 (1898) (bequest in trust for church members to be
used for certain charitable purposes and "anything else whereby the members may
be benefited" upheld on the grounds that the testator intended charitable objects
by his general expression) ; Sutton v. Attorney General, [1884] 28 Ch. D. 464
(bequest to "charitable and deserving" objects upheld on the grounds that the
words were intended to describe one class of objects, i.e., charitable objects).
I " The defendant argued that certain of the purposes listed in the indenture were
aimed at influencing legislation and enhancing the prestige of the legal profession.
Dulles v. Johnson, 155 F. Supp. 275, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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fact that the only expenditures of the Foundation since its establishment had been for a library, the bequest was for educational purposes.
In the light of these two decisions it would appear highly desirable
for draftsmen of wills in which bequests are made to non-charitable
organizations for charitable purposes to use unequivocal charitable trust
terminology in order to avoid litigation and possible unfavorable tax
consequences.
FRANCES H. HALL
Taxation-Sale of a Life Insurance Contract-Capital Gain or
Ordinary Income?
Under a literal interpretation of the capital gain section of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code an endowment or annuity contract would classify as a capital asset. Accordingly, if the owner of such a contract, having
held it for more than six months, transferred it by a bona fide "sale or
exchange," 2 he would not be statutorily prevented from receiving long
term capital gain treatment on his profit.3
This reasoning was followed by a majority of the Tax Court in the
recent case of Percy W. Phillips,4 where the taxpayer was allowed capital gains treatment. The transaction involved the sale by taxpayer of a
life insurance endowment contract thirteen days prior to maturity. Taxpayer received $26,750 in cash for the surrender of all rights, title,
and interest in the contract which at maturity had a value of $27,000.
Although the majority recognized that the taxpayer's paramount motive
for the transaction was to effect a tax saving,5 they held that the endowment contract was a capital asset in taxpayer's hands, that there
was a bona fide sale, that the transaction was not an "agency arrangement
1 Int.

Rev. Code of 1939, § 117, as amended, 65 STAT. 497 (1951) (now INT.
or 1954 § 1221). This section lists only those assets which are not

RFv. CoDE

capital assets. Because endowments and annuities are not listed, it follows that

they must be considered capital assets.
2The words "sale or exchange" do not include surrender of a life insurance or
annuity contract to the obligor wherein the obligee receives payment of an obligation by terms of the contract. Blum v. Higgins, 150 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1945);
Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Frank J. Cobbs, 39 B.T.A.

642 (1939).

1 "A capital asset under Section 1221 is any property held by the taxpayer
whether or not connected with his trade or business, with certain exceptions that
do not embrace insurance contracts. Since an insurance contract is property,
it must be a capital asset. Consequently, the capital gain provisions applying to
the sale or exchange of a capital asset must be available in respect to insurance
contract exchanges, and a long term capital gain should result if the exchanged
insurance contract has been held for six months or more." Freyburger, Tax
ProblentsRelating to Life Insurance and Annuity Contracts,389 INs. L.J. 375, 386

(1955).
'P-H 1958 T.C. Rep. Dec. 1 30.87.
'It is well accepted that a taxpayer may legally minimize his taxes or avoid
them completely by lawful means. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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masquerading as a sale," and that accordingly capital gain treatment
should be allowed.
The Commissioner contended that the increment realized by the
taxpayer represented an interest element and that even a sale or exchange
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code would not convert
this ordinary income into capital gain. The majority answered that
the cash value of the contract at the end of each year is fixed by the
terms of the contract and is based upon certain actuarial assumptions.
These assumptions are conservatively computed to insure the solvency
of the company and the soundness of its insurance protection. Frequently, because premium receipts are in excess of the amounts needed
for the conduct of its business, the company will declare dividends, thus
in effect reducing the cost of the contract.0 From these considerations
the court deduced that the excess of the cash value over the net cost of
the policy represented not only accrued interest realized by the taxpayer on the date of sale, but also favorable actuarial experience and a
rebate of unused operational expense allowance.
In less than a month after the Phillips decision, the United States
Court of Claims, in Arnfield v. United States" denied capital gains treatment to the sale of an annuity contract
There, the annuity matured
three days following the taxpayer's complete assignment to a third party.
The court found that this transaction was a bona fide sale within the
meaning of section 117 of the 1939 Code. Admitting that all the other
requisites of the capital gains section of the 1939 Code were met, the
court thought the true issue to be whether taxpayer could convert

ordinary income? into capital gain by selling the contract prior to maturity.
' "Amounts received as a return of premiums paid under life insurance, endowment, or annuity contracts, and the so-called 'dividend' of a mutual insurance company which may be credited against the current premium, are not subject to tax."
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.2 2 (a)-12 (1943).
'
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' The Arnfield court did not cite Phillips although that case was handed down
some sixteen days prior to Arnfield. Neither court cited the case of Jules J. Riengold, P-H 1941 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. 1141,319, where the petitioner purchased a
mature, $100,000 life insurance policy from the beneficiary in 1933 for the sum of
$15,000. In 1936 the beneficiary was adjudged an incompetent, and the conservators
instituted suit to avoid the 1933 sale and to recover the policy. In settlement of the
suit the petitioner transferred the policy to the conservators and received a cash
payment of $55,000. The court held that the insurance policy was a capital asset in
the
hand and allowed capital gains treatment.
. 9petitioner's
Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 22(b)(2), as amended, 67 STAT. 471 (1951). (now
IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72 (a), (b)). This section includes in gross income
amounts received over and above the contract's cost, except there is allowed a 3%
exclusion per annum for annuity contracts until cost is recovered. The 1954 Code
still includes the gains in gross income, but provides for a different method of
computation, viz., the use of an exclusion ratio to regain the cost of the contract.
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The court found that the facts here fell clearly within the well
-established line of authority' 0 holding that the proceeds received from
a bona fide sale of future income rights are taxable as ordinary income
and not as capital gains. It was contended that this line of authority was
inapplicable because those cases dealt with the sale of a future income
right, whereas, here, taxpayer sold not just the future income right
but rather the entire ownership in the income producing property.
This contention was summarily dismissed as being inconsistent with
Hort v. Commissioner,"z where the court held that a sum received by a
lessor for the cancellation of a lease was taxable as ordinary income
cespite the fact that the lease may for other purposes be treated as
"'property" or "capital."
These two cases, from the facts presented, seem to be indistinguishable in principle. Each transaction involved a transfer of all rights, title,
and interest in a contract which had appreciated in value over the years.
Both contracts were destined to mature in the near future and upon
maturity would be taxable as ordinary income. Moreover, there would
not appear to be any difference in the two types of contracts involved
here.12 If, then, the cases are factually the same, why the inconsistency?
The explanation for this inconsistency lies in an understanding of the
avenues of approach that may be taken in evaluating this type of transaction. One approach is to concede that the capital gains section is
applicable; and whether capital gain or ordinary income treatment will
be accorded the taxpayer will depend on whether the requisites of that
section are met. For example, the dissent in Phillips argued that the
profit was ordinary income because there had been no "bona fide sale
or exchange" of the endowment contract. On the other hand, it can
just as logically be argued, as did the court in Arnfield, that since section
22(b) (2) of the 1939 Code would require ordinary income treatment
upon maturity of the contract, the premature sale of the contract was,
in effect, a sale of future income and clearly within the Hort line of
10 Commissioner v. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958)
(sale of oil and sulphur payment
rights) ; Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (sale of property rights in a
lease by lessor to lessee) ; Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954)
(sale of corporate notes which were in default both as to principal and interest) ;
Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942) (sale of stock
dividends before they became payable); Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d
Cir. 1937) (sale of partnership interest in earned fees) ; Charles E. Sorenson, 22
T.C. 321 (1954) (sale of stock options given as compensation by taxpayer's employer).
11313 U.S. 28 (1941). It is to be noted that taxpayer (lessor) merely cancelled
the lease while still retaining the fee to the property.
"' "The problems involving the sale or taxable exchange of an annuity are
basically the same as shown for other insurance contracts. The annuity contract
can be considered a capital asset .... The basis of the annuity sold or exchanged
is cost less any amounts previously recovered tax free." HERzBERG, SAVING TAXES
THROUGH CAPITAL GAINS 21 (1957).
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cases.' 3 In other words, the result of the transaction in form looks
like a capital gain while in substance it is not.
A quote from the dissent in the Phillipscase illustrates the need for
a judicial yardstick: "The conclusion which in my opinion cannot be
escaped here might be different where a policy was not about to mature,
or did not have a cash surrender value in an amount close to the full
value at maturity, and where the taxpayer could recover his investment
only through a sale to a third party."'14 The court in Arnjield also
recognized this need when it aptly stated that "the law holds no certainty in this area."'15
Thus by judicial admission a denial of capital gain benefits in this
area is obviously left to a case by case determination, leaving no definite
boundaries set for taxpayer to follow. Since the stakes are often worth
the gambling, taxpayers do invent technical property devices in an effort
to save taxes. Therefore it is urged that legislation be enacted whereby
taxpayer will be accorded identical treatment on the proceeds of the
policy whether they be obtained from a "bona fide sale or exchange" or
surrender to the company. At present this area is merely a trap for the
unwary.
RICHARD B. HART
Torts-Negligence-Automobiles-Owner's
Ignition Key in Lock

Liability After Leaving

The recent case of Williams v. Mickens' presented a question of
first impression in North Carolina. The defendant parked his automobile on a public street with the key in the ignition switch and left
it unattended. The automobile was subsequently stolen, and shortly
thereafter was involved in a collision with the plaintiff caused by the
negligence of the thief. The plaintiff sued defendant for his negligence
in leaving the key in the ignition on the theory that defendant should
have foreseen that a thief might steal the automobile and drive it negligently. Since there was no statute involved, the court decided the case on
common law principles. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
nonsuit and the supreme court affirmed. Relying on the case of Ward
v. Southern Ry.,2 the court said that, while they were not willing to admit
3 Cases cited note 9 supra.

" P-H 1958 T.C. Rep. Dec.

30.87 at 502.
1[9692 at 151.

11 CCH 1958 STAND. FFD. TAX REP.

'247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957).
'206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934). (Plaintiff was killed when struck by a
piece of coal thrown from defendant's car; held, assuming defendant was negligent
in allowing thieves to be on the train, nevertheless, the plaintiff cannot recover
since the intervening criminal assault was unforeseeable.)
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that defendant's act of leaving the keys in the switch was negligent, even
if such were the case, to allow recovery would do violence to the rule3
of proximate cause as understood and applied in this jurisdiction.
4
Thus the court was reaffrming its position taken in previous cases that
if between the defendant's negligent act and plaintiff's injury, there
is an intervening criminal act by a third person producing the injury,
and such act was not intended by the defendant and could not have
been reasonably foreseen by him, the causal chain between the original
negligence and the accident is broken and the defendant's act of negligence is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Most jurisdictions have refused to hold the car owner liable in "keytheft" cases similar to the principal case. The cases fall into two general
classes: those not involving a statute or ordinance which expressly prohibits the owner or operator of a motor vehicle from leaving his key in
the ignition when the vehicle is left unattended, 5 and those in which
such a statute is involved.
At common law. In a majority of the cases arising in jurisdictions
where there is no applicable statute the plaintiff has been denied recovery
as a matter of law. 6 Various theories for such holdings have been advanced by the courts: (1) the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff
absent actual knowledge of the presence of thieves or some other circumstance that might reasonably indicate a foreseeable risk of harm to
the plaintiff ;7 (2) leaving the key in the ignition was not a negligent
'Foreseeability of injury is a test of proximate cause. See, e.g., McNair v.
Richardson, 244 N.C. 65, 92 S.E.2d 459 (1956) ; Welling v. Charlotte, 241 N.C.
312, 85 S.E.2d 379 (1955) ; Boone v. North Carolina R.R., 240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E.2d
380 (1954).
'Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934); Chancey v. Norfolk
& Western Ry., 174 N.C. 351, 93 S.E. 834 (1917); see also Note, 29 N.C.L. REv.
210 (1951).
An example of such a statute is this District of Columbia traffic regulation:
"Every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a lock to lock the starting lever,
throttle, switch, or gear shift lever, by which the vehicle is set in motion, and no
person shall allow any motor vehicle operated by him to stand unattended on any
street or in any public place without first having locked the lever, throttle, or switch
by which said vehicle may be set in motion." TRAFFIc AND MOTOR VEHIcLE REGULATIONS FOR THE DisRnICr OF COLUMBIA § 58.

A statute of this type has no application when the automobile is parked on
private property or on a private drive. R W. Claxton, Inc., v. Schaff, 169 F.2d 303
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948).
' Bennett v. Arctic Insulation, Inc., 253 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Richards v.
Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So. 2d 573 (La.
App. 1951); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Gower v.
Lamb, 282 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955); Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94,
81 A.2d 377 (L. 1951) ; Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599
(4th Dept. 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1027, 80 N.E.2d 542 (1948) ; Wagner v. Arthur,
73 Ohio L. Abs. 16, 134 N.E.2d 409 (1956) ; Teague v. Pritchard, 38 Tenn. App.
686. 279 S.W.2d 706 (1954).
' Bennett v. Arctic Insulation, Inc., supra note 6; Richards v. Stanley, supra
note 6; Gower v. Lamb, supra note 6.
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act;8 (3) assuming the defendant negligent, still the intervening criminal act was sufficient to insulate the defendant's negligence and establish
the intervening cause as the efficient or proximate cause of the accident 0 In at least one jurisdiction it was held that the questions of
negligence and proximate cause should be submitted to the jury, on
the ground that reasonable men might differ under the circumstances
of the case. 10
Violation of a statute. When statutes have been involved in the
"key-theft" cases the courts have been less consistent in their holdings.
Perhaps a majority of the courts have held the defendant car owner
not liable."- In so holding, the courts have said: (1) the purpose of
the statute "was largely for the protection of the car owners themselves and as an aid in proper law enforcement in the discouragement of
theft and pilferage" ;12 (2) the statute expressly stated that it was not
applicable in a civil action;13 (3) even though the defendant was negligent in violating the statute, nevertheless the negligent driving of the
thief was an intervening act whch caused the accident and superseded
the original negligence of the defendant car owner.' 4 On the other
hand, there is a strong minority view to the effect that the violation of
the statute by the defendant warrants the submission of the facts to the
jury.'5 These courts have reasoned that the statute was passed as a
public safety measure, not as a crime deterrent, and its violation is
either treated as prima facie evidence of negligence" or as constituting
negligence per se; 17 in either case the question of proximate cause is
'Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 1951).
' Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947) ; Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14
N.J. Super. 94, 81 A.2d 377 (L. 1951) ; Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74
N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dept. 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1027, 80 N.E.2d 542 (1948) ; Wagner v. Arthur, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 16, 134 N.E.2d 409 (1956).
10 R. W. Claxton, Inc., v. Schaff, 169 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dcnied,
335 U.S. 871 (1948) ; Eesley v. Dottellis, 61 A.2d 564 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1948) ;
Bullock v. Dahlstrom, 46 A.2d 370 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1946). (The statute was not
applicable in these cases. See note 5 supra.)
" Frank v. Ralston, 145 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Ky. 1956) ; Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc.,.
122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952) ; Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81
N.E.2d 560 (1948) ; Anderson v. Theisin, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950);
Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co.. 91 So. 2d 243 (Miss. 1956).
" Anderson v. Theisin, 231 Minn. 369, 371, 43 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1950).
13 Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Gower v. Lamb, 282
S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955).
"Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952) ; Galbraith
v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948); Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet
Co., 91 So. 2d 243 (Miss. 1956).
'" Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624 (1954);
Garbo v. Walker, 57 Ohio Op. 363, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 368, 129 N.E.2d 537 (1955).
10 Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., mpra note 15.
1
Garbo v. Walker, 57 Ohio Op. 363, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 368, 129 N.E.2d 537"
(1955).
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Still a third view is that violation of the statute is a legal
for the jury.'
or proximate cause of the harm as a matter of law and the case should
not go to the jury. 9
The court in the principal case indicates the difficulty that would
arise were the defendant car owner in the "key-theft" cases held liable.
The court said:
If the owner is liable for injury inflicted by the thief at the next
street crossing, there appears no reason why liability should not
extend to the next town, the next county, or the next state. If
leaving the key in the switch creates liability, leaving it on the
seat, or on the owner's desk where a thief could easily find it,
would seem also to imply liability. If liability exists on the day
of the theft, does it not continue to the next day, and the next?.
Surely, ownership of a motor vehicle does not involve such
hazard. 20
Further insight into the "key-theft" cases may be gained by an
appraisal of the risks which the car owner creates by leaving his key
in the ignition. In so doing, he does not assume that it will be driven.
At most he creates the risk that it will be stolen and driven. By comparison, one who lends his car to another obviously knows that his car
will be driven. In the "key-theft" case the risk that the car will be
stolen-and by a thief who is a negligent driver-is materially less than
the risk involved where an owner entrusts his car to another for the
very purpose of being driven. The North Carolina court,, however,
21
has held that a bailor is not liable for a bailee's negligent driving.
There seems to be no logical reason for holding the owner liable in the
"key-theft" cases when by analogy he has created a lesser risk that the
"8 Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624 (1954);
Garbo v. Walker, mtpra note 17.
1 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
790 (1944). The Ross case overruled Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D.C. 320 (D.C.
Cir. 1916), where the court held, on facts essentially similar and under a similar
ordinance, that the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. The District of Columbia, however, has recognized that some
limit must be placed on the car owner's liability. In Howard v. Swagart, 161 F.2d
651 (D.C. Cir. 1947), the thief, some twelve hours after the theft, allowed another
person to borrow the car. This person negligently collided with the plaintiff's car.
The court, holding for the defendant car owner, stated, "It cannot fairly be said
that this court meant, by the Ross and Schaff decisions, to impose liability on the
owner ... of an unlocked car for the negligent action of every person, other than
the thief, driving it subsequent to the theft." Id. at 655. See also Casey v.
Corson and Gruman Co., 221 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where the court held that
the defendant's negligence in leaving his car in a private parking lot in the District
of Columbia with the keys in the ignition was too remote in time, place, and
circumstances to have been a proximate cause of a collision taking place in Petersburg, Virginia, in which the plaintiff was injured by the thief's negligent driving
of the defendant's car. (The ordinance was not applicable.)
2 247 N.C. at 263, 100 S.E.2d at 513.
"1Reich v. Cone, 180 N.C. 267, 104 S.E. 530 (1920).
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car will be driven negligently than has a person who lends his car to
another.

22

23
The test of foreseeability has been a big factor in all of these cases.
It is conceded that there may be circumstances which make foreseeable
24
the possibility of harm resulting from leaving keys in a parked car.
However, such circumstances are not usually present. There is usually
no evidence from which a jury could properly infer that the defendant
car owner could foresee that the thief would steal the car and drive
it negligently. 25 It is admitted that by leaving the keys in the ignition
lock of the automobile one increases the risk of theft and that in certain
circumstances this might be held to have been foreseeable as a matter of
law, but can it be said that it is foreseeable that a thief will be negligent ?26 Absent a statute that expressly states that the defendant car
owner in this type case is to be held liable for the thief's negligence or

some special circumstance which would put the owner on notice, there
would seem to be no justification for holding him liable.27
BAILEY PATRICK, JR.
23

Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).

23 An example of the conflict in the courts as to what is foreseeable is shown

by the following inconsistent statements made by the Illinois appellate courts:
"[The defendant car owner] is required by all rules of common sense and reason
to know that a thief, in his effort to escape from the scene of the theft, may have
no greater regard for traffic lights or traffic regulations than he had for the
criminal statute making it a felony to steal the car." Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill.
App. 359, 368, 77 N.E.2d 537, 541 (1948); "It would seem reasonable that a car
thief, in order to avoid attracting attention and arrest, would be meticulous in
observing traffic laws such as speeding, running stop lights, etc." Cockrell v.
Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 624, 101 N.E.2d 878, 879 (1951). In Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624 (1954), the Illinois Supreme
Court settled the question by adopting the rule of the Ostergardcase.
"Leaving the automobile illegally parked in such condition as would render it
dangerous to children who are known by the owner to be exposed to the hazard,
Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N.C. 649, 130 S.E. 638 (1925) ; leaving an
intoxicated person in an automobile with the keys in the ignition, Morris v. Boiling,
31 Tenn. App. 577, 218 S.W.2d 754 (1948) ; Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co., 198
S.C. 476, 18 S.E.2d 331 (1942).
"The New York Appellate Division held in Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div.
635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dept. 1947), that even though car owners, prior to the
theft of defendant's car, had been warned through the newspapers and over the
radio not to leave their cars unlocked or the keys inside the car because of the
commonness of such thefts, still the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff who
had been struck by the defendant's car which was being driven by the thief at the
time.
" Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 596, 106 N.E.2d 395, 399 (1952).
"It is our observation that in the absence of clear legislative declaration this result
would not ordinarily be reached except where -the surrounding circumstances clearly
point to both a high probability of intervening crime, and of like pursuant negligent
operation of the vehicle by the thief. We do not presume to affirm or deny that
such circumstances are highly probable in the District of Columbia or the First
District of the Appellate Court of Illinois. We do assert with some satisfaction
that such circumstances are not reasonably foreseeable in this jurisdiction."
" For additional material on this subect see Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 633 (1957)
and 43 CAL L. Rv. 140 (1955).
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Torts-Wrongful Death-Effect of Settlement on Allegedly Negligent
Beneficiary's Right to Share in Proceeds
In re Estate of Ives' presented the North Carolina court with a case
involving a situation unparalleled in this or apparently any other jurisdiction. The facts of the case are as follows: the deceased, while riding
as a passenger in an automobile owned and driven by her son, was
killed in a collision with another vehicle. Pursuant to the rights granted
to it in a policy of liability insurance, the son's insurer entered into a
compromise agreement with the administrator of the mother's estate
for all claims which the administrator "had or might have" for the
death of the intestate resulting from this collision. A release was given
in which it was stated "that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment is not to be construed as an
admission of liability on the part of the persons . . .hereby released by

whom liability is expressly denied. ' '2 Subsequently the administrator
brought a proper 3 proceeding to determine if the son should be entitled
to share in the distribution of the wrongful death assets. 4 Affirming the
decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that in spite of the
fact that there were no findings of fact that the son was at fault or that
he knew of the compromise agreement, and notwithstanding the express
denial of liability in the release, the son could not share in the proceeds
paid by the insurer in settlement of this claim. The basis of the decision
was centered around the equitable maxim that "no one will be permitted to enrich himself by his own wrong."
As a general rule this maxim is usually applied in three categories of
cases wherein there appears the question of the negligent beneficiary's
receiving amounts otherwise due him. In the first of these categories,
where the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance has caused the death
of the cestui que vie, the majority view is that a merely negligent beneficiary will not be precluded from taking the share due him. 5 To be
precluded from sharing it must be shown not merely that the beneficiary
caused the death of the cestui que vie, but that the death was a result
of a willful or felonious act on the part of the named beneficiary. Like1248
N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 807 (1958).
2
1d. at 179, 102 S.E.2d at 809.
3

In re Stone, 173 N.C. 208, 91 S.E. 852 (1917).

'The court held that all amounts received under a compromise agreement in a
wrongful death action are distributed as wrongful death assets. Ibid.
Tippens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Minasian
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936) ; PATTERSON, ESSENTAIs
oF INsuRANcE LAW § 35 (2d ed. 1957); RICEARDs, INsJRANcE § 129 (5th ed.
1952).
'Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910); Bullock
v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71 (1951); Neff v.
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wise in the second category, cases of intestate succession, the beneficiary or distributee must, as a general rule, be guilty of something
7
more than negligence to be precluded from taking the share due him.
Those jurisdictions that do allow an "ancestor murderer" to inherit
justify such by a strict interpretation of the statute of descent and distribution when there is no statute in point otherwise.8
In the third category, actions for wrongful death, it is the North
Carolina view and the majority view that the negligent beneficiary will
not be allowed to share in the distribution of any wrongful death proceeds. 9 At least one case has allowed the negligent beneficiary to recover,10 but it is to be noted that in this jurisdiction wrongful death
assets are treated as assets of the decedent's estate," and the theory of
action in that case was that the administrator sought to recover in the
right of the deceased, not for the beneficiary. An examination of the
various state statutes conferring a right of action for death by wrongful
act reveals that the majority of jurisdictions treat wrongful death
recoveries as compensation for the decedent's next of kin, and not as
general assets of the decedent's estate.
In a jurisdiction such as North Carolina, where the wrongful death
assets are treated as compensation, 12 it is relatively easy to understand
why the negligent beneficiary-distributee will be precluded from taking
a distributive share, and yet not precluded from taking as a beneficiary
in a life insurance policy or in cases of intestate succession. The apparent inconsistency is explained when it is realized that in cases of
life insurance and intestate succession the negligent beneficiary is only
receiving that which he would have received had the deceased died a
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100 (1952); PATERSON, op. cit. supra note 5, § 35.
"In re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N.Y.S. 738 (1914) ; McMichael v. Proctor, 243
N.C. 479, 91 S.E.2d 231 (1956) (where widow, acquitted of second degree murder,
nevertheless admitted she fired the pistol that killed intestate husband, was allowed
to receive her dower); Legette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403, 85 S.E.2d 576 (1955);
Ward
v. Ward, 174 Va. 331, 6 S.E.2d 664 (1940).
8
Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Corin. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953). See also Notes, 26 N.C.L.
RF~v. 232 (1948), 33 N.C.L. REv. 702 (1955).
'Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947) ; Arnold v. Jacobs,
319 Mass. 130, 65 N.E.2d 4 (1946). See also Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785 (1948). A
minority of jurisdictions hold that the negligence of one of the beneficiaries is a bar
to the action in toto, on the doctrine that the negligence of one is imputed to the
others; see, e.g. Peterson v. Cochran & McCluer Co., 308 Ill. App. 438, 31 N.E.2d
825 (1941).
10 Wymore v. Mahaska County, 78 Iowa 396, 43 N.W. 264 (1889).
'" IowA CoDE ANN. fr 635.9 (1950).
1 "The amount recovered in such action is not liable to be applied as assets, in
the payment of debts or legacies, except as to burial expenses of the deceased .... "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1957). "The plaintiff in such action may recover
such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting
from such death." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1950), Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235
N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
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normal death, while in cases involving the recompense of a wrongful
death the proceeds in question are those which the (potential) beneficiary would not have received had the deceased died a normal death
at the time in question.
However, the instant case is unique in that it applies this principle of
non-profiting by wrongdoing where there has been no judicial finding of
negligence, but rather where there has been an express denial of liability
agreed upon by the parties. Thus the established rule of law invoked
has been extended in its applicability to a situation where there has been
a wrongful death recovery from a source of funds paid in settlement on
behalf of the allegedly negligent beneficiary to release that beneficiary
from a claim of negligence. This extension of the old maxim appears
to be well grounded in reason when one considers the presumptions of
negligence arising from the case and the source of the funds from which
the beneficiary seeks to partake.
One presumption of negligence seems to arise out of the amount of
the settlement in relation to the face value of the insurance policy.
Here the insurance company paid the administrator seventy percent
of the maximum liability it could incur on the policy. From this fact
it appears logical to assume that the insurer most certainly thought that
its insured was at fault. As a general rule evidence of a compromise
agreement is not admissible into evidence as an admission of liability and
proves only that peace was brought.13 However, the instant case does not
conflict with the general rule as it did not present a question of the admissibility of evidence, but rather a question of the inferences to be
drawn from facts already before the court. It would seem that a second
presumption of negligence arises from the fact that during the two
years that elapsed between the collision and the hearing in the supreme
court, the son had made no claim against the driver of the other vehicle
14
for damages which it is reasonable to assume that his car incurred.
Considering the source of the funds as a bar to recovery, no cases
could be found where the holder of a policy of automobile liability
insurance collected anything under that policy where he was the driver
of the automobile. 15 Furthermore, there is the fact that in North Carolina, as the administrator in a wrongful death proceeding acts for the
"' Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 83 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa. 1949) ; Penn
Dixie Lines Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E.2d 410 (1953).
14248 N.C. at 183, 102 S.E.2d at 812. However, the court apparently overlooks
the fact, or fails to make mention of it, that the driver of the other vehicle had likewise brought no claim against the son alleging fault by the son.
"1But a holder of a liability policy has recovered under that policy where he was
a passenger in an accident involving his automobile where coverage of the policy
extended to those injured by an authorized driver of the insured. Aetna Cas. and
Surety Co. v. General Cas. and Surety Co., 285 App. Div. 767, 140 N.Y.S.2d 670

(1955).
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benefit of the beneficiaries and not the estate of the deceased, the administrator becomes the representative of the beneficiaries in this type of
action."" This means that if the son could be a beneficiary the administrator had to represent the son's claim, and in the principal case the
administrator's claim for negligence was actually against the son himself. This begs the ridiculous question of how could the administrator
have represented the son's claim against himself for his own alleged
wrong.
WALToN

K.

JOYNER

'0 Pearson v. National Manufacture & Stores Corp., 219 N.C. 717, 14 S.E.2d
811 (1941). "[T]he right of action created by statute for wrongful death does not
constitute an asset of the estate, but belongs to the beneficiaries designated by the
statute as beneficiary of the recovery, as is the law in this state, [and] the administrator in bringing the action is pro hac vice their representative and not the
representative of the estate."

